"What proof did she really have that it was
God?"--Jean Paul Sartre
There was a madwoman who had hallucinations; someone used to
speak to her on the telephone and give her orders. Her doctor
asked her, "Who is it who talks to you?" She answered "He says
it's God." What proof did she really have that it was God? If
an angel comes to me, what proof is there that it's an angel?
And if I hear voices, what proof is there that they come from
heaven and not from hell, or from the subconscious, or a
pathological condition? What proves that they are addressed to
me? What proof is there that I have been appointed to impose my
choice and my conception of man on humanity? I'll never find
any proof or sign to convince me of that. If a voice addresses
me, it is always for me to decide that this is the angel's
voice; if I consider that such an act is a good one, it is I
who will choose to say that it is good rather than bad. . . .
We have no excuse behind us, nor justification before us. We
are alone, with no excuses. . . . man is condemned to be free.
Condemned, because he did not create himself, yet, in other
respects is free; because, once thrown into the world, he is
responsible for everything he does.. . . The existentialist
does not think that man is going to help himself by finding
in the world some omen any which to orient himself. Because
he thinks that man will interpret the omen to suit himself.
[from Sartre's "The Humanism of Existentialism." tras. by Bernard
Frechtman]
I prepared the following texts and "observations" for a summer course on "French
Phenomenology and Existentialism" at Marquette University. They are still of interest to me inasmuch as they relate to the
question of human freedom. The notion of "free will" is often evoked by those who desire someone else's behavior to
conform to their own moral standards (which they assume to be absolute). They believe they know what others "ought"
to do and they also believe that others are "free" to do as they ought. Anyone who does otherwise is judged to be
deficient in good will. I believe that these texts demonstrate that Sartre's notion of freedom is of no help to traditional
moralists in their effort to persuade others to behave differently. Indeed, one of Sartres chief insights is that there
is no one and no thing outside our own will to whom or which we can look for moral guidance. Moreover, we cannot by
taking thought alter that which we freely intend. Nevertheless,
the possibility remains that we can--on the level of reflective consciousness--be more or less attuned to and in sync with the
pre-reflective upsurge of freedom which is our fundamental project.
6-14-90 General observations and questions concerning Part IV,
chapter 1, of Being and Nothingness.
I found this chapter extremely interesting. The question that remains in my mind is "On what level of consciousness is
freedom operative--reflective or pre-reflective? or does this question somehow miss the point? As I look back over the first twenty or
thirty pages of the chapter, I find the following passages that would seem to confirm the relevance of my question:
The voluntary act is distinguished from the involuntary
spontaneity in that the latter is a purely unreflective
consciousness of causes across the pure and simple
project of the act. As for the motive, in the
unreflective act it is not an object for itself but a
simple non-positional self-consciousness. The structure
of the voluntary act, on the other hand, requires the
appearance of a reflective consciousness which apprehends
the motive as a quasi-object or which even intends it as
a psychic object across the consciousness reflected-on
(451) [Paper back edition 581].
In an extended passage just prior to the one quoted above, Sartre
indicates that all deliberations-- characteristic of my
"voluntary" acts --are actually just another mode of action pursued in service
of a fundamental project which from all indications arises unreflectively and constitutes being-for-itself:Past motives, past causes, present motives and causes,
future ends, all are organized in an indissoluble unity
by the very upsurge of a freedom which is beyond all
causes, motives, and ends. The result is that a
voluntary deliberation is always a deception. How can I
evaluate causes and motives on which I myself confer
their value before all deliberation and by the very
choice which I make of myself? . . . if I am brought to
the point of deliberating, this is simply because it is
a part of my original project to realize motives by means
of deliberation rather than by some other form of
discovery (by passion, for example, or simply by action,
which reveals to me the organized ensemble of causes and
of ends as my language informs me of my thought). There
is therefore a choice of deliberation as a procedure
which will make known to me what I project and
consequently what I am. And the choice of deliberation
is organized with the ensemble motives-causes and end by
free spontaneity (450-451) [581].
If there remains any doubt as to the primary level on which
freedom operates, consider the following description of
"intention" which underlies reflection deliberation:Now that we have defined cause and motive, it is
necessary to give to this project which underlies
reflection the name intention. To the extent therefore
that the will is an instance of reflection, the fact of
its being placed so as to act on the voluntary level
demands for its foundation a more profound intention. It
is not enough for the psychologist to describe a
particular subject as realizing his project in the mode
of voluntary reflection; the psychologist must also be
capable of releasing to us the profound intention which
makes the subject realize his project in this mode of
volition rather than in a wholly different mode.
Moreover, it must be clearly understood that any mode of
consciousness whatsoever may have produced the same
realization once the ends are posited by an original
project. Thus we have touched on a more profound freedom
than the will . . . (452) [582].
The verdict is in, then. Reflective deliberation as to the proper
course of action is only one mode of volition and always
presupposes a more fundamental choice on the pre-reflective
level. This more fundamental choice is the upsurge of freedom that
constitutes being-for-itself. It is still conscious, according to
Sartre, and still free, but it would seem to be fundamentally
pre-reflective. This is further borne out in Sartre's assertion
that the will--on the level of reflective volition can sometimes
appear to conflict with the fundamental project of the
For-itself. For example, Sartre says that his fundamental project may be one
of inferiority and he will, therefore
persist in manifesting [himself] in a certain kind of
employment because [he] is inferior in it, whereas in
some other field [he] could without difficulty show
[himself] equal to the average. It is this fruitless
effort which I have chosen, simply because it is
fruitless--either because I prefer to be the last rather
than to be lost in the mass or because I have chosen
discouragement and shame as the best means of attaining
being (472) [608].
In a case such as this, Sartre indicates, an individual will
always be in bad faith on the level of the reflective will:
It is obvious, however, that I can choose as a field of
action the province in which I am inferior only if this
choice implies the reflective will to be superior there.
To choose to be an inferior artist is of necessity to
wish to be a great artist; otherwise the inferiority
would be neither suffered nor recognized (472) [608].
Regarding this same artist, Sartre, continues:
. . . this very will is in bad faith; that is, it flees
the recognition of the true ends chosen by the spontaneous consciousness (473) [608] .
Yet even this bad faith is in service of the artists more
fundamental project, for the subject must be desperate in his
pursuit of greatness in order to realize his more fundamental
project of inferiority. Thus, any reflective volition is always
secondary to a pre-reflective project which is fundamental. This
explains how the will can appear to conflict with the fundamental
project:Thus presented, the "paradox" of the inefficacy of
voluntary decisions will appear less offensive. It
amounts to saying that by means of the will, we can
construct ourselves entirely, but that the will which
presides over this construction finds its meaning in the
original project which it can appear to deny, that
consequently this construction has a function wholly
different from that which it advertizes, and that finally
it can reach only details of structures and will never
modify the original project from which it has issued
(476) [612].
It seems, then, that we have correctly interpreted this
fundamental project as originating on a pre-reflective level.
Furthermore, we must also dispose of any idea that the reflective
level can ever change the original project. Rather, as the above
cited texts make clear, we can only reason from the perspective
of our fundamental project which is the perspective in light of
which we choose reflective deliberation as a mode of volition in the
first place.
Sartre, Jean Paul Being and Nothingness. Hazel E. Barnes,
trans. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956.
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